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In this study we investigated age-related and individual differences in habitual (model-free)
and goal-directed (model-based) decision-making. Specifically, we were interested in three
questions. First, does age affect the balance between model-based and model-free
decision mechanisms? Second, are these age-related changes due to age differences
in working memory (WM) capacity? Third, can model-based behavior be affected by
manipulating the distinctiveness of the reward value of choice options? To answer
these questions we used a two-stage Markov decision task in in combination with
computational modeling to dissociate model-based and model-free decision mechanisms.
To affect model-based behavior in this task we manipulated the distinctiveness of reward
probabilities of choice options. The results show age-related deficits in model-based
decision-making, which are particularly pronounced if unexpected reward indicates the
need for a shift in decision strategy. In this situation younger adults explore the task
structure, whereas older adults show perseverative behavior. Consistent with previous
findings, these results indicate that older adults have deficits in the representation and
updating of expected reward value. We also observed substantial individual differences
in model-based behavior. In younger adults high WM capacity is associated with greater
model-based behavior and this effect is further elevated when reward probabilities are
more distinct. However, in older adults we found no effect of WM capacity. Moreover,
age differences in model-based behavior remained statistically significant, even after
controlling for WM capacity. Thus, factors other than decline in WM, such as deficits in
the in the integration of expected reward value into strategic decisions may contribute to
the observed impairments in model-based behavior in older adults.
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INTRODUCTION
Many simple everyday decision-making tasks, such as which
cereals to take for breakfast or which subway to take to work
in the morning, can be solved via habitual decision mecha-
nisms. However, in more complex decision scenarios, such as
how to spend annual bonus or how to plan retirement sav-
ings, it may be adaptive to anticipate the consequences of future
decisions and to choose the options that are likely to yield
higher long-term benefits. In the current study we examined
age and individual differences in the interplay between habit-
ual and goal-directed decision-making. We had three specific
research questions in mind: first, does aging affect the bal-
ance between habitual and goal-directed decision mechanisms?
Second, are age differences in the interplay of these decision
mechanisms related to age differences in working memory (WM)
capacity? Third, can model-based choice behavior be affected by
manipulating the distinctiveness of the reward value of different
choice options? To address these questions we adapted a two-state
Markov decision task (Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012)
in combination with computational reinforcement learning (RL)
modeling.
MODEL-FREE AND MODEL-BASED DECISION-MAKING
The dissociation between habitual and goal-directed mecha-
nisms is at the core of many current theories of learning and
decision-making (Daw et al., 2005; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010;
Kahneman, 2011). Habitual or model-free learning refers to the
acquisition of behavior based on associations between actions
and effects: actions that are followed by reward are more likely
to reoccur (Thorndike, 1911). Model-free learning is a robust
and computationally efficient mechanism. However, it can come
at the cost of being inflexible, especially in dynamically chang-
ing environments, which constrain the adaptive value of habitual
responses (Doll et al., 2012). Computational accounts suggest
that habitual learning is driven by the discrepancy between the
current reward and the expected plus the (discounted) sum of
all future rewards (i.e., the prediction error signal) (Sutton and
Barto, 1998; Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008). Results from elec-
trophysiological studies in animals and neuroimaging work in
humans show that these reward predictions errors seem to be
coded in phasic changes of dopaminergic activity in the midbrain
and ventral striatum (Schultz et al., 1997; Montague et al., 2004;
D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Niv et al., 2012).
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In comparison, goal-directed or model-based decision-
making reflects choices that are guided by internal goal represen-
tations or “cognitive maps” (Tolman, 1948; Miller and Cohen,
2001). These representations involve knowledge of the struc-
ture of the environment that can be used to make adaptive and
foresighted decisions (Doll et al., 2012). One way of thinking
about these representations is in terms of a decision space that
represents the consequences of actions with respect to sequen-
tial transitions in the environment and possible future rewards.
The advantage of model-based decision mechanisms is that they
allow individuals to flexibly adjust behavior to changes in the
environment. One downside of model-based decision-making
is that it is computationally more expansive and effortful than
the relatively more automatic habitual mechanisms. Recent neu-
roimaging work has started to investigate the neural mechanisms
underlying model-based decision-making (Gläscher et al., 2010;
Daw et al., 2011). Whereas results from Daw et al. (2011) sug-
gest that model-based and model-free decisions may implicate
overlapping neural systems, involving the ventral striatum and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), findings from Gläscher
et al. (2010) show that the learning of new task structures may
involve cortical areas such the lateral PFC and parietal cortex.
RELATIONS BETWEENWORKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND
MODEL-BASED DECISION-MAKING
Support for the idea that model-based decision-making relies
on higher-order cognitive control mechanisms comes from a
recent study that combined a two-state Markov decisions task
with a concurrent WM paradigm (Otto et al., 2013). This study
showed that high WM load resulted in a reduced degree of
model-based behavior, suggesting that goal-directed decisions
rely on WM functions and the associated neural systems. Similar
results were obtained by Worthy and Maddox (2012). Using a
dynamic decision-making task these authors showed that WM
load seems to shift behavior from a heuristics-based win-stay
lose-shift (WSLS) strategy toward a model-free (reinforcement-
based) strategy (Worthy and Maddox, 2012). Taken together,
evidence from these studies suggests that model-based decision-
making may partially rely on WM function and that increasing
WM demands may lead to a shift from model-based to model-
free decision-making. Another implication from these findings
is that model-based decision-making abilities can be understood
as a limited cognitive resource. However, what remains unclear
from these studies is the degree to which age and individual dif-
ferences in WM capacity may be associated with differences in
model-based behavior (Otto et al., 2013).
AGE DIFFERENCES IN LEARNING AND DECISION-MAKING
Results from recent studies on age differences in learning and
decision-making suggest that older adults are impaired in learn-
ing from uncertain and ambiguous reward. This does not seem
to be the case in situations in which reward information is fully
predictable (deterministic). Electrophysiological results indicate
that learning impairments are associated with deficits in error
detection as well as less differentiated reward representations
(Eppinger et al., 2008; Eppinger and Kray, 2011; Pietschmann
et al., 2011; Hämmerer and Eppinger, 2012). Moreover, results
from recent fMRI studies show that age-related impairments in
RL are associated with a reduced correlation between reward pre-
diction errors and ventral striatal activity in older than younger
adults (Chowdury et al., 2013; Eppinger et al., 2013). In line
with the idea of age-related changes in striatal prediction error
signaling, Samanez-Larkin et al. (2010) found that subopti-
mal financial decision-making in older adults is associated with
increased temporal variability of the ventral striatal BOLD signal.
Taken together, these results are consistent with several the-
oretical proposals, suggesting that age-related impairments in
reward-based learning might result from reduced dopaminergic
projections from themidbrain to the ventral striatum and vmPFC
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Frank and Kong, 2008; Hämmerer and
Eppinger, 2012). However, it should be noted that there is also
evidence indicating that age-related deficits in learning are, at
least partially, mediated by decreased white matter integrity in
fronto-striatal pathways (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012).
Only a few studies so far have focused on age-related dif-
ferences in more complex learning and decision-making (Mata
et al., 2010; Worthy et al., 2011; Worthy and Maddox, 2012).
In a recent study Worthy and Maddox (2012) used a dynamic
decision-making task in which reward depended on the choice
history. Results showed that older adults performed better on
this task than younger adults. Using computational approaches
the authors showed that this effect was due to the fact that older
adults relied more on decision heuristics such as a win-stay lose-
shift, whereas younger adults relied on RL. Findings by Mata et al.
(2010) show that older adults perform poorer in a probabilistic
inference task than younger adults if the decision environment
favors the use of a cognitively demanding strategy. This is con-
sistent with the idea that strategic, planning-related cognitive
processes are a constrained resource, especially in older adults.
Taken together, these results point to the view that age-related
impairments in decision-making may depend on the complexity
of the decision environment (Mata et al., 2010). Older adults may
do well or even better than younger adults in tasks that favor the
use of decision strategies with shorter temporal horizons, such as
WSLS, whereas older adults may be impaired in decision-making
if they have to use strategic, model-based processes.
Although the results of the previous studies may point to an
age-related shift in the balance between model-based and model-
free decision processes, the tasks applied in these studies do not
allow to formally dissociate between these decision mechanisms.
To address this question and to examined age and individual dif-
ferences in model-free and model-based decision processes, we
adapted a two-stage Markov decision task (cf. Daw et al., 2011)
that allowed us to separate the contributions of these decisions
mechanisms to choice behavior (see Figure 1A).
Specifically, we were interested in three major research ques-
tions (a) Does aging affect the balance between model-based and
model-free decision-making mechanisms? (b) Are age-related
changes in decision mechanisms related to age differences in WM
capacity?; and (c) Can model-based behavior in older adults be
supported by enhancing the distinctiveness of the reward value of
the different choice options?
The two-stage Markov decision task consists of two deci-
sion stages in each trial (see Figure 1A). The first decision stage
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic Figure of the 2-stage Markov decision task. In this
task participants have to constantly update reward predictions on the second
stage (model-free decision-making) and use these reward predictions to make
goal-directed decisions on the first stage of the task. To support model-free
learning in the two age groups we manipulated the randomwalks that
determine the probability of getting a reward at the second stage. We applied
two different probability ranges, onewith a narrow range of reward probabilities
(25–75% reward probability) and one with a wide range of reward probabilities
(0–100% reward probability). (B)Model predictions. Left panel: Simulations
show that model-free decision-making is reflected in a main effect of reward.
That is, stay behavior on the first choice depends on whether behavior on the
previous trial was rewarded or not. Model-free behavior is independent of the
transition probability structure. Right panel: Model-based behavior is reflected
in an interaction between transition on the previous trial and reward on the
previous trial. That is, model-based behavior takes the model-free information
as well as knowledge of the transition structure into account.
involves two choice options that are associated with different tran-
sition probabilities to the second-stage choice options that are
then either rewarded or not rewarded. In this task, participants
have to constantly update reward predictions at the second stage
(model-free decision-making) and use this information prospec-
tively to make goal-directed (model-based) decisions at the first
decision stage on the next trial (see Figure 1A). To manipulate
the demands on the representation and updating of reward value
we varied the distinctiveness of the reward probabilities at the sec-
ond stage (see Figure 1A). This was done by increasing the range
of the reward probabilities of the choice options at the second
stage on each trial. The larger the range of the reward proba-
bilities of the four potential choice options, the easier it should
be to differentiate and represent the reward histories associated
with these options (cf. Eppinger et al., 2011). More differentiable
reward probabilities on the second stage should support the abil-
ity to make deliberate, goal-directed decisions on the first stage
and may hence be less demanding in terms of the representation
of the stage transition structure of the task.
Given previous findings that point to age-related behavioral
deficits in complex decision tasks (Mata et al., 2010) we expected
older adults to be impaired in model-based decision-making
compared to younger adults. Furthermore, given evidence for
age-related impairments in learning from probabilistic outcomes
(Eppinger et al., 2008; Hämmerer et al., 2011; Pietschmann et al.,
2011), we predicted that older adults should benefit from more
distinctive reward probabilities at the second stage of the task.
That is, we should find enhanced model-based decision-making
in the wide compared to the narrow probability range condition.
To investigate the association between individual differences in
WM and individual differences in model-based decision-making
we also acquired a WM capacity using the operation span task
(Turner and Engle, 1989; Unsworth et al., 2005). Given results
suggesting that WM capacity is critical for model-based behavior
we expected that higher WM capacity should be associated with
model-based choice patterns (Otto et al., 2013). To the degree
that this is the case, age-related deficits in model-based decision-
making may be mediated by age-related decline in WM capacity
(Salthouse et al., 1989; Salthouse, 1994).
MATERIAL AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty younger and sixty two older adults took part in the study.
Two older adults had to be excluded because they were unable
to perform the experimental tasks. Two younger adults were
excluded because they did not return for the second testing ses-
sion. Two further younger adults needed to be excluded, one due
to technical problems during data acquisition and the other due
to chance level performance in the WM task. Thus, the effec-
tive sample consisted of 56 younger adults (mean age: 24, age
range 20–30 years, 27 females) and 60 older adults (mean age:
69, age range: 56–78 years, 27 females). Participants gave written
informed consent. The Institutional Review Board of the Max-
Planck Institute for Human Development approved the study.
Participants completed a biographical and a personality question-
naire (Carver and White, 1994) as well as several psychometric
tests: (1) Identical pictures test (Ekstrom et al., 1976); (2) Raven’s
Progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1998); (3) Spot-the-Word test
(Baddeley et al., 1992). As shown in Table 1 older adults had
lower scores on the Identical Pictures test and Raven’s matrices
than younger adults (p’s < 0.001, η2 > 0.46). In contrast, older
adults obtained higher scores than younger adults on the Spot-
the-Word test (p < 0.001, η2 = 0.24). Consistent with previous
findings from larger population-based samples (e.g., Li et al.,
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Table 1 | Psychometric variables displayed separately for the two age groups and the two working memory performance groups.
Age group Younger adults Performance effect Older adults Performance effect Age effect
WM performance
groups
Low
(mean, SE )
High
(mean, SE )
p-value, effect size Low
(mean, SE )
High
(mean, SE )
p-value, effect size p-value, effect size
Age 25.2 (0.6) 23.8 (0.6) p = 0.08, η2 = 0.06 69.1 (1.0) 68.4 (0.9) p = 0.60, η2 = 0.00 p < 0.001, η2 = 0.97
Raven 11.3 (0.5) 12.9 (0.5) p = 0.03, η2 = 0.08 5.7 (0.5) 7.4 (0.7) p = 0.05, η2 = 0.07 p < 0.001, η2 = 0.46
Ospan partial score 20.7 (1.5) 49.1 (1.9) p < 0.001, η2 = 0.72 9.2 (1.1) 34.6 (2.1) p < 0.001, η2 = 0.67 p < 0.001, η2 = 0.14
Ospan total score 45.4 (2.0) 63.6 (0.9) p < 0.001, η2 = 0.56 26.3 (2.2) 53.3 (1.4) p < 0.001, η2 = 0.66 p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20
Processing speed 29.0 (1.0) 33.8 (0.7) p < 0.001, η2 = 0.25 22.03 (0.6) 21.5 (0.7) p = 0.55, η2 = 0.00 p < 0.001, η2 = 0.57
Spot-a-word 19.5 (1.1) 20.4 (1.3) p = 0.58, η2 = 0.00 25.4 (1.0) 26.7 (0.9) p = 0.33, η2 = 0.02 p < 0.001, η2 = 0.24
BIS 19.5 (0.7) 18.82 (0.8) p = 0.50, η2 = 0.00 19.86 (0.6) 17.93 (0.6) p = 0.03, η2 = 0.08 p = 0.69, η2 = 0.00
BAS 13.5 (0.3) 13.6 (0.3) p = 0.82, η2 = 0.00 13.5 (0.4) 13.0 (0.3) p = 0.29, η2 = 0.02 p = 0.48, η2 = 0.00
2004), these results suggest age-related reductions in fluid intel-
ligence and age-related improvements in crystallized intelligence.
We did not find significant age differences behavioral inhibition
or approach (BIS/BAS) scores (p’s > 0.48) (Carver and White,
1994).
MEDIAN SPLIT OF GROUPS BASED ONWORKING MEMORY CAPACITY
To examine the associations between individual differences in
WM capacity on model-based and model-free decision-making
we performed a median split for the operation span total score
separately for the two age groups (Unsworth et al., 2005). High
and low capacity groups did not differ significantly with respect
to mean age (younger adults: p = 0.08, older adults: p = 0.60,
see Table 1). However, as expected, given the well-documented
positive association between WM capacity and fluid intelligence
(Duncan et al., 2012), we found significantly higher Raven scores
for high than low WM capacity groups in both age groups (p’s <
0.05; η2’s > 0.07). Significant differences between high and low
capacity in processing speed were observed for younger (p <
0.001; η2 > 0.25), but not for older adults (p = 55). High and
low WM capacity groups did not differ with respect to semantic
knowledge in either age group (p’s> 0.33) (see Table 1).
STIMULI
Stimuli on the first stage were two airplanes that either pointed
to the top or the bottom of the screen, indicating the two differ-
ent choice options. Stimuli on the second stage were 8 colored
figures (“GoGos”) that we generated using a freeware on the
gogos-crazybones.com website and processed for presentation
purposes in Photoshop (see Figure 1A). Background colors of the
second stage stimuli were either blue or brown. Feedback stim-
uli either indicated a monetary gain of 10 Euro Cents, displayed
in green or a neutral outcome of 00 Euro Cents, displayed in
red (see Figure 1A). Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch com-
puter screen using the program EPrime 2.0 software (PST Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA).
TASK
The task involves two decision stages. At the first stage partici-
pants had to make a decision between two choice options (the
two airplanes), which occurred randomly either on the left or
right side of the screen. This decision determined the transition
to the next (second) stage (see Figure 1A). We refer to more
likely (70%) transitions as common transitions and less likely
(30%) transitions as rare transitions. Participant had to indi-
cate their choice within 2 s of stimulus presentation using the
“f” or “j” key on a standard computer keyboard. If no response
occurred within 2 s the trial was aborted and a new trial started.
At the second stage participants had to make another decision
between two choice options (the GoGos), which were displayed
randomly either on the left or the right side of the screen (see
Figure 1A). This decision had to be made within 2 s of stimu-
lus presentation using the same keys as in the first decision (“f”
and “j”). If no response occurred within 2 s, three white question
marks appeared on the screen for 1 s and the trial was aborted.
Choices were either rewarded (+10 Cents) or not rewarded (∗00
Cents). The probabilities of getting a reward were determined
by Gaussian random walks (see Figure 1A). The feedback stim-
uli were displayed for 1 s. Before and after the feedback stimulus a
fixation cross was displayed for 500ms. Reward probabilities were
determined by a slowly drifting random walk. At each trial we
added Gaussian noise with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of
0.025 to the reward probabilities. To manipulate the demands on
the updating of reward value representation we applied two types
of random walks with different reflecting boundaries: in the nar-
row probability range condition the random walks had reflecting
boundaries of 0.25 and 0.75 (Daw et al., 2011). In the wide proba-
bility range condition we increased the reflecting boundaries from
0.00 to 1.00 (for examples see Figure 1A). The broader reflecting
boundaries in the wide probability range condition result in more
differentiable random walks for the four second-stage options.
Participants performed 201 trials with the narrow random walk
and 201 trials with the wide randomwalk in two separate sessions.
To improve subject’s understanding of the task structure we
designed a cover story for the task. The cover story is about a busi-
nessman who has to decide between two airplanes each of which
will bring him to one of two islands (see Figure 1A). The air-
line is called “Surprise” and is somewhat unreliable with respect
to its destinations (the transition probabilities are made explicit
and are practiced by the participants). At each of the islands the
businessman can trade with one of two populations of inhabi-
tants (represented by the GoGo Figures). The productivity of the
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populations changes across time. The task of the businessman
is to make as much money as possible by integrating informa-
tion about the reward probability on the second stage and the
transition structure on the first stage.
PROCEDURE
Participants performed two sessions, which were separated by a
minimum of 1 week and a maximum of 3 weeks. In the first
session participants performed a demographic questionnaire, the
BIS/BAS personality questionnaire (Carver and White, 1994),
Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1998) and one ver-
sion of the two-stage Markov decision task (either with narrow
or wide probability range condition). In the second session sub-
jects performed an automated version of the Operation Span Task
(Unsworth et al., 2005), Spot-a-Word and the Identical pictures
test (Li et al., 2004), a version of the two-stage Markov decision
task and an additional experimental task, data of which will be
presented elsewhere. Half of the participants in each group per-
formed the narrow probability range condition first and vice versa
for the second half of the samples. Participants were informed
about the nature of the transition probability structure. We also
explained (and showed) to the subjects that the likelihood of get-
ting a reward at the second stage varies over time and differs
between sessions.
Prior to the task in the first session, participants com-
pleted a computerized training session, which was supervised
by instructed student research assistants. In the first part of the
training participants were introduced to the reward probability
structure of the second (model-free) stage of the task. To familiar-
ize participants with probabilistic reward they had to first perform
10 choices between options with a fixed reward probability of
60%. To support the understanding of probabilistic information
we always referred to reward probabilities in terms absolute num-
bers (i.e., getting reward in 6 of 10 cases). Thereafter, participants
were given 20 additional trials, in which they had to find the
option with the highest reward probability (out of four choice
options). After making sure that everyone found the best option
we explained that the reward probabilities would change slowly
across the experiment. For illustration purposes two examples of
the random walks (see Figure 1) were shown in a graph.
In the next training phase participants were introduced to
the transition probability structure on the first stage. That is, we
informed them about the fact that there are common (character-
istic) and rare (uncharacteristic) transitions and showed them a
graphical picture of the transition structure (similar to Figure 1).
Then participants performed 20 trials in which they practiced
the transitioning from the first stage options to the second stage
options (without receiving a reward). Finally, subjects played 30
trials of the experimental task (involving all stages as well as
probabilistic rewards) using a different stimulus set [for similar
procedures see Daw et al. (2011)]. Before the task in the second
session participants performed a short practice session of 20min.
Reward was accumulated across sessions and participants were
compensated according to their earnings in the task.
DATA ANALYSIS
Stay-switch behavior at the first stage was analyzed using Matlab
(MATLAB, Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA) and SAS (SAS Institute
Inc, Cary, NC).We defined stay-switch behavior as the probability
to repeat a choice on the first stage as a function of the tran-
sition (common or rare) and the outcome (reward, no reward)
on the previous trials. Mean stay probabilities were analyzed
using a repeated measures ANOVA with the between subjects
factors Age Group (younger, older) and WM capacity (high,
low), as well as the within subjects factors probability range
(narrow, wide), previous transition type (common, rare) and pre-
vious outcome (reward, no-reward). For follow-up analyses we
calculated differences measures for model-free behavior [(com-
mon reward + rare reward) − (common no reward + rare no
reward)] and model-based behavior [(common rewarded + rare
unrewarded) − (rare rewarded + common unrewarded)] (see
Figure 1B). The model-based and model-free difference values
were analyzed using an ANOVA with the factors age group and
range of reward probability.
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
Choice behavior was fit using a hybrid RL algorithm (Daw et al.,
2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012). This algorithm assumes that
choices on the first stage of the task are driven by a weighted
combination of model-based RL, which accounts for the tran-
sition structure, and model-free SARSA (λ) TD learning. The
weighting of model-based vs. model-free decision mechanism
is determined by the free parameter omega, ω, which is held
constant across trials and is constrained from 0 to 1. If ω
approaches 0 behavior is model-free, which is reflected in a main
effect of reward (see Figure 1B). In contrast, an omega close
to 1 indicates model-based choice behavior, which is reflected
in an interaction between transition structure and reward on
the previous trial (see Figure 1B). Participants are assumed to
select actions stochastically according to a softmax function. The
choice probabilities were determined by the state-action val-
ues. For the model-fit we estimated the free parameters of the
hybrid model for each probability range and subject individ-
ually via maximum likelihood. We first iterated all parameters
individually by using a grid search to get a rough estimate.
Subsequently, we extracted the twelve best fitting parameter com-
binations of both probability ranges and entered them as starting
points for a precise parameter estimation, using Matlab routine
fMincon.
The task consists of two stages and three states (first stage:
SA; Second stage: SB, SC) (see Figure 1A). Each state is associated
with two actions (aA, aB). At both stages (i) a state-action value
function QSi(a) is learned that maps each state action pair to its
expected value. We refer to the model-based value function at the
first stage asQS1MB and to the model-free value function asQSiMF .
MODEL-FREE STATE ACTION VALUES
Model-free state action values at the second stage were updated
using SARSA(λ) temporal difference learning (Rummery and
Niranjan, 1994). The state-action pairs were updated in each trial
t according to:
QS2MF (a, t + 1) = QS2MF (a, t) + α2(r(t) − QS2MF (a, t))
where αi is the learning-rate at a given stage (here stage 2) and r(t)
is the received reward in that trial.
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The state-action value and the reward at the second stage are
then used to update the model-free values for the next choice at
the first stage of the next trial. This updating mechanism followed
the same temporal difference learning rule, with an additional
parameter, λ allowing eligibility traces:
QS1MF (a, t + 1) = QS1MF (a, t) + α1
(
QS2MF (achosen, t)
− QS1MF (a, t)
) + α1λ
(
(r(t) − QS2MF (a, t)
)
Note that eligibility traces are not assumed to carry over from
trial to trial. The reason for this is the task structure that involved
changing reward probabilities (the randomwalks) for each option
across trials.
MODEL-BASED STATE-ACTION VALUES
Model-based state-action values are computed using Bellman’s
equation by taking the model-free state-action values from the
second stage and the transition probabilities into account.
QS1MB (a1) = HighTran ∗ max
[
QMFS2−B (a)
]
+LowTran ∗ max [QMFS2−C (a)
]
QS1MB (a2) = LowTran ∗ max
[
QMFS2−B (a)
]
+HighTran ∗ max [QMFS2−C (a)
]
In this equation “HighTran” is defined as the highest transi-
tion probability of the current condition (0.7) and ”LowTran”
is defined as the lowest transition probability of that condition
(0.3). Before each block participants were explicitly instructed
about the nature of the transition probabilities and practiced the
transitioning between states.
In the full hybrid model the Qnet state-action value was cal-
culated as the weighted sum of model-based and model-free
values:
QS1net = ω ∗QS1MB (a) + (1 − ω) ∗QS1MF (a)
where ω is the weighting parameter. At the second stage the Qnet
state-action value is equal to the model-free state-action value
(QS2net = QS2MF ).
SOFTMAX RULE
Choice probabilities at the first stage were calculated according to
a softmax rule:
PSi
(
a1,t
) =
exp
(
βi ∗
[
QSnet1
(
a1,t
) + π ∗ rep(a1)
])
(
exp
(
βi ∗
[
QSnet1
(
a1,t
) + π ∗ rep(a1)
])
+ exp (βi ∗
[
QSnet1
(
a2,t
) + π ∗ rep(a2)
]))
where βi is the inverse softmax temperature paramter control-
ling the distinctiveness of the choices. We allowed both learning
parameters (α1, α2) and the softmax temperature parameters (β1,
β2) to differ between the two stages. The indicator function rep(a)
is defined as 1 if a is a top-stage action and is the same as was
chosen on the previous trial, zero otherwise. Taken together, the
function rep(a) and the parameter π capture the degree of per-
severation at the first-stage (π > 0) or the switching (π < 0) at
first-stage options (Lau and Glimcher, 2005).
Choice probabilities at the second stage were calculated as
follows:
PSi
(
a1,t
) =
exp
(
βi ∗QSnet2
(
a1,t
))
(
exp
(
βi ∗QSnet2
(
a1,t
))) +
(
exp
(
βi ∗QSnet2
(
a2,t
)))
The model contained 7 free parameters (α1, α2, β1, β2, π, λ, ω).
The median parameter values are shown separately for the two
age groups, the two performance groups and the two probability
ranges in Table 2.
MODEL FITS
An ANOVA with the factors age group, performance group and
probability range on the negative log-likelihoods (-LL) showed
no significant age differences in the model-fits (p = 0.79) and no
significant difference between WM capacity groups (p = 0.16)
(see Table 2). However, we obtained a significant main effect of
probability range, indicating better model fits for the wide com-
pared to narrow probability range (p = 0.004, η2 = 0.07). Taken
together, these results show comparable model fits for younger
and older adults as well as for high compared to low WM capac-
ity groups. Furthermore, as shown inTable 2 themodel fits as well
as the parameter estimates are comparable with those of previous
studies (Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012).
RESULTS
OVERALL TASK PERFORMANCE
To examine age differences in overall task performance we calcu-
lated the mean payoffs (earnings), separately for each individual
and probability range condition. Mean payoffs were analyzed
using an ANOVA with the between subject factors Age group,
WM capacity and probability range condition. As shown in
Figure 2C the analysis showed higher mean payoffs for younger
compared to older adults (p = 0.03, η2 = 0.04). Furthermore,
participants earned more money in the wide probability range
condition compared to the narrow probability condition (p <
0.001, η2 = 0.26, see Figure 2C). No significant interaction
effects were obtained (p’s> 19).
EFFECTS OF AGE GROUP ON MODEL-BASED BEHAVIOR
The overall ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between
age group, transition type, and outcome F(1,112) = 29.66, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.14. To test whether there are significant age differ-
ences in decision strategies (model-based vs. model-free) we ran
an ANOVA with the factors age group, WM capacity, probabil-
ity range condition and decision strategy (model-based, mb vs.
model-free, mf). This analysis revealed a significant interaction
between age group and decision strategy F(1, 112) = 17.41, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.12. Separate analyses for the two decision strategies
revealed significant age differences for model-based decision-
making (t < 4.04, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20), but not for model-free
decision-making (t = −1.31, p = 0.19).
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Table 2 | Computational model parameters (Median, 25th and 75th percentile) as a function of Age group (Younger older adults) and WM
Performance group (low performers, high performers) and Transition probability range (narrow, wide).
Age/performance Probability range Parameter β1 β2 α1 α2 λ π ω −LL
Younger adults
Low performance
group
Narrow 25th percentile 2.33 2.64 0.24 0.30 0.05 0.10 0.09 180.04
Median 3.91 4.71 0.63 0.49 0.23 0.21 0.57 208.55
75th percentile 8.90 5.81 0.85 0.69 0.52 0.42 0.69 231.83
Wide 25th percentile 2.63 2.83 0.26 0.37 0.03 0.06 0.15 170.27
Median 5.12 4.02 0.52 0.56 0.17 0.16 0.57 200.94
75th percentile 10.37 5.21 0.86 0.73 0.62 0.33 0.79 220.00
Younger adults
High performance
group
Narrow 25th percentile 3.96 3.67 0.04 0.52 0.00 0.05 0.21 226.90
Median 7.63 4.82 0.39 0.64 0.09 0.11 0.61 191.52
75th percentile 10.73 6.04 0.67 0.86 0.89 0.167 0.74 171.43
Wide 25th percentile 3.46 6.57 0.07 0.39 0.03 0.09 0.34 159.39
Median 9.99 4.59 0.40 0.65 0.15 0.12 0.64 183.55
75th percentile 12.39 3.78 0.58 0.85 0.36 0.24 0.78 214.80
Older adults
Low performance
group
Narrow 25th percentile 2.41 1.83 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 249.69
Median 5.83 2.92 0.65 0.33 0.33 0.18 0.24 218.33
75th percentile 9.44 5.24 0.95 0.87 0.90 0.27 0.67 188.11
Wide 25th percentile 2.64 1.43 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.15 161.15
Median 6.12 3.36 0.33 0.44 0.33 0.14 0.35 208.76
75th percentile 13.54 4.91 0.82 0.88 0.83 0.29 0.49 234.82
Older adults
High performance
group
Narrow 25th percentile 2.19 1.98 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.01 170.26
Median 3.62 2.69 0.40 0.56 0.38 0.18 0.15 202.09
75th percentile 6.42 6.20 0.84 0.90 0.82 0.35 0.48 246.27
Wide 25th percentile 2.52 2.10 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.01 148.89
Median 6.32 3.75 0.62 0.32 0.49 0.18 0.11 187.34
75th percentile 8.98 5.89 0.91 0.69 0.80 0.35 0.48 232.80
To further examine age differences in model-based behav-
ior we performed separate analyses for the factors transi-
tion type and reward. These analyses showed a significant
effect of age group only on rare rewarded trials (t = 2.80,
p = 0.006, η2 = 0.07). To confirm that the age effect is spe-
cific to rare rewarded trials rather than rare unrewarded tri-
als we performed a post-hoc contrast between the two con-
ditions and tested for age differences. We obtained a signif-
icant interaction between age group and reward. F(1, 112) =
17.41, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.12, indicating that older adults show
enhanced stay behavior after rare transition that lead reward than
younger adults, whereas age groups don’t differ in their behav-
ior after rare transitions that are followed by no reward (see
Figure 2B).
Thus, age-related deficits in decision-making seem to be par-
ticularly pronounced if participants receive an unexpected reward
after an uncharacteristic transition. In such a situation younger
adults tend to switch to the other first stage choice option because
this option is more reliably associated with the stimulus that was
rewarded on the previous trial. In contrast, older adults tend
to perseverate on options that were rewarded, independently of
whether the reward was preceded by a common or rare transition
(see Figure 2A).
EFFECTS OF WM CAPACITY AND AGE DIFFERENCES IN MODEL-BASED
BEHAVIOR
The overall analysis also revealed a significant interaction between
age group, WM capacity, transition type and outcome, F(1,112) =
10.14, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.04. Separate analyses for the two age
groups showed a significant interaction between WM capac-
ity, transition type and outcome for younger adults (p = 0.007,
η2 = 0.09), but not for older adults (p = 0.20). Analyses of the
difference values showed enhanced model-based choice behav-
ior in high WM capacity younger adults compared to low WM
capacity younger adults (t = 2.83, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.14) but no
effects of WM capacity in older adults (t = −1.30, p = 0.20) (see
Figure 3A). Follow-up analyses for the factorsWM capacity, tran-
sition type and reward revealed greater switching behavior after
rare transitions that were followed by reward for high perform-
ing younger compared to high performing older adults (t = 2.59,
p = 0.01, η2 = 0.11). As shown in Figure 3B, younger adults
with high WM capacity show enhanced switching behavior after
rare transitions that were followed by reward.
EFFECTS OF PROBABILITY RANGE ON MODEL-BASED BEHAVIOR
Furthermore, the overall ANOVA revealed a significant inter-
action between probability range, transition type and outcome
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Probability of repeating the same first stage choice as a
function of the transition on the previous trials (common, rare transition) and
the outcome received on the previous trial (reward, no reward). Stay
probabilities are displayed separately for younger adults (left panel) and older
adults (right panel), error bars reflect the standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).
(B) Age differences in stay behavior after rare transitions as a function of age
group and reward on the previous trial. (C) Mean pay-offs in Euro per session,
displayed separately for the factors Age group and Probability range
condition. (D) Correlations between mean pay-offs in Euro and degree of
model-based choice behavior (ω-parameter).
FIGURE 3 | (A) Probability of repeating the same first stage choice as a
function of the transition on the previous trials (common, rare transition) and
the outcome received on the previous trial (reward, no reward). Stay
probabilities are displayed separately for younger adults (left panel) and older
adults (right panel) and low and high WM capacity groups. Error bars reflect
the standard error of the mean (s.e.m.). (B) Age differences in stay behavior
after rare transitions and reward on the previous trial as a function of age
group and WM capacity.
F(1,112) = 5.16, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.05, as well as between WM
capacity, probability range, transition type and outcome
F(1, 112) = 4.24, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.04. Separate analyses for the
factor WM capacity showed a significant interaction between
probability range, transition type and reward for high WM
capacity groups (p < 0.006, η2 = 0.12) but not for low capac-
ity groups (p = 0.60). Analyses of the difference values showed
enhanced model-based choice behavior in the wide probabil-
ity range compared to the narrow probability range for high
capacity groups (t = 2.76, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.13) but not for
low WM capacity groups (t = 0.18, p = 0.86) (see Figure 4).
Separate analyses for the factors transition type and reward
showed a significant main effect of probability range only
for common rewarded trials (t = 2.97, p < 0.004, η2 = 0.08).
These results suggest that the effects of probability range
on model-based behavior are primarily driven by enhanced
stay behavior after common transitions that were followed by
reward.
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Difference values (proportion stay trials) for model-based
behavior [(common rewarded + rare unrewarded) − (rare rewarded +
common unrewarded)]. Model-based differences values are shown
separately for the factors Age group (younger, older adults), WM
capacity (high, low capacity) and probability range (narrow, wide
probability range). Error bars reflect the standard error of the mean
(s.e.m.). (B) Model-based (MB) and model-free (MF) differences values,
displayed separately for the factors Age group, WM capacity and
Probability range condition. Error bars reflect the standard error of the
mean (s.e.m.).
GENERALIZED LINEAR MIXED MODEL ANALYSIS
Given that the first stage choice proportions are binomial data
(and may hence not be normally distributed) we also used a
mixed logit model (mixed effects logistic regression) as imple-
mented in the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2013) in the statistical
software R (R Development Core and Team, 2010) to fit choice
behavior [see also Daw et al., 2011]. The design involved the
same factor structure as for the repeated measures ANOVA.
The analysis revealed qualitatively similar results as the overall
results from ANOVA described above. We obtained a signifi-
cant interaction between age group, transition type and out-
come (p < 0.001), reflecting greater model-based choice behavior
in younger than older adults (see Figure 2 and Table 3). We
also found a significant interaction between age group, WM
capacity, transition type and outcome (p < 0.001). Separate
analyses for the two age groups showed enhanced model-
based behavior in high compared to low WM capacity groups
in younger adults (p < 0.001) but not in older adults (p =
0.69), (see Figure 3A). Furthermore, we obtained a significant
interaction between the factors probability range, transition
type and outcome (p < 0.01). As shown in Figure 4, model-
based behavior seems to be more pronounced in the wide
compared to the narrow probability range condition. Taken
together, the results of the mixed effects logistic regression are
qualitatively consistent the results of the repeated measures
ANOVA.
WM CAPACITY COVARIANCE ANALYSIS
To further analyze the effects of WM capacity on age differences
in model-based and model-free decision-making we performed
analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) with the between-subjects fac-
tor age group, within-subjects factor probability range and the
(continuous) covariate WM capacity. For model-based differ-
ences values the analysis showed a significant main effect of age
group F(1, 112) = 41.96, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15. Importantly, this
effect remained significant after controlling for WM capacity
F(1,112) = 4.39, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.02, indicating that additional
factors contributes to age differences in model-based behavior
beyond the effects of WM capacity. Furthermore, we obtained
a significant interaction between age group and WM capac-
ity F(1, 112) = 12.19, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.04. Separate analyses for
the two age groups showed a significant effect of WM capac-
ity for younger adults (t = 3.06, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.08), but not
for older adults (t = 0.69, p = 0.87). No significant effects of
age group, WM capacity or probability range were obtained for
model-free differences values (p’s > 0.14). Taken together, these
results line up with the findings of the median split analysis and
show that in younger adults enhanced WM is associated with
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Table 3 | Results of the logistic regression analysis with the between
subjects factors Age group and Working memory capacity and the
within subjects factors Probability range condition (walk), transition
type and reward.
Predictor Estimate p-value
(Intercept) 1.35 0.08
Walk −0.18 0.18
Transition 0.21 0.10
Reward 0.26 0.05
Age 0.08 0.87
WM −0.17 0.73
Walk × transition 0.06 0.67
Walk × reward −0.06 0.67
Transition × reward 1.62 <0.001
Age × walk 0.12 0.15
Age × transition 0.00 0.96
Age × reward 0.08 0.31
WM × walk 0.11 0.20
WM × transition −0.07 0.43
WM × reward −0.02 0.84
Age × WM 0.09 0.77
Walk × transition × reward −0.33 0.01
Age × walk × transition −0.02 0.85
Age × walk × reward 0.05 0.52
Age × transition × reward −0.78 <0.001
WM × walk × transition −0.05 0.51
WM × walk × reward 0.06 0.47
WM × transition × reward −0.64 <0.001
Age × WM × walk −0.10 0.06
Age × WM × transition −0.02 0.61
Age × WM × reward 0.00 0.99
Age × walk × transition × reward 0.12 0.16
WM × walk × transition × reward 0.12 0.15
Age × WM × walk × transition 0.02 0.67
Age × WM × walk × reward −0.06 0.20
Age × WM × transition × reward 0.33 <0.001
Age × WM × walk × transition × reward −0.03 0.55
greater model-based behavior, which is not the case in older
adults. Importantly, the results also show that age differences in
model-based behavior remain, even after controlling for WM
capacity.
MODELING RESULTS
To examine the effects of age group and WM capacity on the
model parameters we applied an ANOVA with the between sub-
jects factors age group and performance group and the within
subjects factor probability range. For the ω-parameter, we found
a significant main effect of age group F(1,112) = 20.42, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.15, As shown in Figure 5 younger adults showed a higher
degree of model-based decision-making (as reflected in the ω-
parameter) than older adults. Furthermore, we obtained a signifi-
cantly greater λ-parameter for older compared to younger adults,
F(1, 112) = 7.72, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.06 (see Figure 5). This finding
indicates that in older adults the reward received on the second
FIGURE 5 | Left panel: Mean parameter estimates for the omega (ω-)
parameter, displayed separately for the two age groups and the two WM
capacity groups. The (ω-) parameter reflects the relative contribution
model-based and model-free mechanisms to first stage choice behavior.
Right panel: Mean parameter estimates for the lambda (λ-) parameter,
displayed separately for the two age groups. The (λ-) parameter reflects the
direct influence of reward on the previous trial on first stage choice
behavior. Error bars reflect the standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).
stage has a greater impact on choice behavior on the first stage
than this is the case in younger adults. For the inverse temper-
ature parameter on the first stage (β1) we found a significant
interaction between age group andWM capacity, F(1, 112) = 5.13,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.04. Separate analyses for the two age groups
showed a more differentiated choice pattern in high WM capac-
ity compared to low WM capacity younger adults (t = 2.02,
p = 0.05, η2 = 0.07) but no effect of WM capacity in older adults
(t = −1.19, p = 0.24), (see Table 2). Finally, we obtained a sig-
nificant main effect of age group on the learning rate α1 on the
second stage F(1, 112) = 4.2, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.04. As shown in
Table 2, younger adults had a lower learning rate on the sec-
ond stage than older adults, indicating that they update value
representation less rapidly than older adults.
DISCUSSION
In this study we examined age-related and individual differ-
ences in habitual (model-free) and goal-directed (model-based)
decision-making. Specifically, we were interested in three major
questions: (a) Does aging affect the balance between model-
based and model-free decision mechanisms? (b) Are age-related
changes in decision mechanisms related to age differences in WM
capacity, and (c) Can model-based behavior be supported by
manipulating the distinctiveness of the reward value of the dif-
ferent choice options? To examine these questions, we used a
two-stage Markov decision task that allows us to separate the con-
tributions of model-free and model-based decision processes to
choice behavior (Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012). To
support model-based behavior in this task we manipulated the
range of the reward probabilities associated with the different
options on the second stage (see Figure 1A). More differentiable
reward probabilities on the second stage should support the abil-
ity to make deliberate, goal-directed decisions on the first stage
andmay hence be protective against age-related deficits in model-
based decision-making. Furthermore, we acquired aWMcapacity
measure to investigate the impact of WM capacity on individual
differences in model-based decision-making automated opera-
tion span, (Unsworth et al., 2005). Based on these WM capacity
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scores we separated younger and older samples into high and low
WM groups.
AGE-RELATED IMPAIRMENTS IN MODEL-BASED DECISION-MAKING
The analysis of the stay-switch behavior on the first stage revealed
significant impairments inmodel-based decision-making in older
adults (see Figure 1A). In contrast, no significant age differences
in model-free decision-making were obtained (see Figures 1A,
4B). An analysis of age differences in the model-parameters sup-
ports these findings by showing a significant age-related reduc-
tion of the ω- parameter, which reflects the relative contribution
of model-based compared to model-free decision processes to
choice behavior on the first stage of the task (see Figure 5). An
analysis of overall task performance showed higher mean pay-offs
in younger than older adults, indicating that the more model-
based strategy in younger adults is beneficial in terms of over-
all performance (Figure 2C). Furthermore, correlation analyses
showed that in younger adults greater model-based behavior is
associated with higher mean pay-offs. This is not the case in older
adults (see Figure 2D). Thus, older adults who engage in a more
model-based strategy do not seem to benefit from it in terms of
overall performance. One interpretation of this effect might be
that even though those older adults make strategic decisions on
the first stage, they do not consistently choose the option with
the highest expected value on the second stage. That is, overall
deficits in task performance in older adults may reflect problems
in the integration of model-free and model-based information.
Interestingly, age-related deficits in model-based decision-
making seem to be particularly pronounced if participants receive
an unexpected reward after an uncharacteristic transition and
have to revise their decision strategy (see Figure 2B). In such a
situation younger adults tend to switch to the other first stage
option because this option is more reliably associated with the
stimulus that was rewarded on the previous trial. This switching
behavior can be understood in terms of a model-based explo-
ration in which the younger adults switch to a state that may offer
a greater probability of reward than the one they currently exploit.
In contrast, older adults tend to perseverate on options that were
rewarded, independently of whether the reward was preceded by a
common or rare transition. Therefore, the current results suggest
that older adults have deficits in applying their knowledge of the
task structure if the reward on the previous trial reinforces stay
behavior, whereas the fact that it was an uncharacteristic transi-
tion indicates the need for a shift in the response strategy on the
first stage.
This interpretation is supported by two results of the model-
ing analysis: first, older adults show a higher λ- parameter than
younger adults (see Figure 5). The λ- parameter reflects the direct
influence of reward on the previous trial on stay-switch behav-
ior on the first stage. That is, a high λ- parameter in older adults
indicates that their choice behavior on the first stage is primar-
ily influenced by the outcome on the previous trial rather than
their representation of the expected value of the choice options
on the previous trial. Second, we found a higher learning rate
for older than younger adults on the second stage of the task.
This result indicates that older adults are less consistent in their
choice behavior on the second stage of the task, which may lead to
deficits in building up differentiated reward value representations.
Thus, our results are in line with previous findings that point
to age-related impairments in the representation and updating
of the expected value of choice options during RL (Eppinger
et al., 2008; Eppinger and Kray, 2011; Hämmerer et al., 2011;
Pietschmann et al., 2011). Furthermore, our findings line up with
data from neuroimaging studies, which indicate that impairments
RL in older adults are associated with age-related deficits in stri-
atal reward prediction error signaling (Chowdury et al., 2013;
Eppinger et al., 2013). However, it seems also plausible that age-
related deficits in model-based decision-making are due to more
complicated neuromodulatory effects in higher-order cortical
areas, particularly the ventromedial and lateral prefrontal cortex.
Consistent with such view, recent findings from Samanez-Larkin
et al. (2012) suggest that age-related deficits in reward-based
learning are, at least partially, mediated by decreased white mat-
ter integrity in fronto-striatal pathways (Samanez-Larkin et al.,
2012).
Taken together, the current results suggest that age-related
impairments in the updating of reward value representations may
lead to deficits in goal-directed decision-making in older adults.
These deficits are particularly pronounced if reward on the pre-
vious trial reinforces stay behavior, whereas the fact that it was
an uncharacteristic transition indicates the need for a shift in the
response strategy on the first stage. In these situations younger
adults use their knowledge of the task structure to engage in
strategic exploratory behavior, whereas older adults perseverate
on the option they are currently exploiting.
EFFECTS OF WM CAPACITY AND AGE GROUP ON MODEL-BASED
BEHAVIOR
To examine the effects of individual differences in WM capac-
ity on model-based behavior in the two age groups, we acquired
a WM measure automated operation span, (Unsworth et al.,
2005) and subdivided the younger and older adult samples into
high and low WM capacity groups. We found enhanced model-
based behavior for high capacity compared to low capacity
younger adults, but no effect of WM capacity in older adults (see
Figure 3A). Moreover, similar to the age-effects on model-based
behavior, WM capacity-related differences in younger adults were
most pronounced in switching behavior after rare transitions that
were followed by reward (see Figure 3B). These results suggest
that WM capacity is an important determinant of whether indi-
viduals engage in a model-based or model-free decision strategy.
Furthermore, high WM capacity in younger adults seems to be
associated with greater ability for strategic exploratory behavior.
The results in younger adults are consistent with recent findings
from a study that used the two stage Markov decision task in
combination with a concurrent WM manipulation (Otto et al.,
2013). Results of this study showed that taxing WM disrupts
model-based behavior in younger adults.
What remained unclear from this study is at which decision
stage the effects of WM occur. This is an interesting question,
because on the one hand, WM may play a role for the represen-
tation and maintenance of the state actions values of the different
options on the second stage. On the other hand, WM might also
play role while trying to integrate model-free information with
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information about the transition structure on the first stage of the
task (Gershman et al., 2013; Otto et al., 2013). The current find-
ings show that in younger adults the effects of WM capacity are
enhanced if the reward probabilities of the different options are
more differentiable from each other (in the high probability range
condition, see Figure 4). Hence, our findings seem more consis-
tent with the first view, suggesting that enhanced WM capacity
is associated with a greater ability to maintain model-free value
representations and use them for model-based decision-making.
ABSENCE OF WM EFFECTS ON MODEL-BASED BEHAVIOR IN OLDER
ADULTS
As shown in Figure 6 in older adults we found no significant
correlation between WM capacity and model-based behavior. In
contrast, in younger adults enhanced WM capacity is associated
with a higher degree of model-based behavior, particularly in
the high probability range condition. At first sight, one way to
interpret these effects would be in terms of a floor effect in WM
capacity in older adults. However, as also shown in Figure 6,
even those older adults with high WM capacity (comparable to
young high performing individuals), did not show evidence for
enhanced model-based behavior. These findings suggest that fac-
tors other than WM might explain the age-related decline in
model-based behavior. This interpretation is backed-up by the
results of a covariance analysis which show that age differences
in model-based behavior remain significant even after controlling
for the effects of WM capacity. The question is what those fac-
tors might be. Consistent with the interpretation offered above, it
could be argued that deficits in the updating of expected reward
value might lead to these impairments. However, it could also
be argued that that these impairments are due to more com-
plex interactions between areas that represent the expected value
of options and areas that are involved in implementing strate-
gic operations, such as the lateral PFC. Results from a recent
fMRI study using a three state Markov learning task suggest that
age-related impairments in learning of higher order transition
structures (models) are associated with a reduced recruitment of
the lateral prefrontal cortex (Eppinger et al., 2012). Furthermore,
FIGURE 6 | Scatter plots for the correlations between model-based
difference values (see Methods) and WM capacity (OSPAN total
scores), displayed separately for the low and the high reward
probability range conditions. Younger adults are shown in red, older
adults are shown in blue.
results of that study indicate that model-based learning correlates
positively with reasoning abilities but not with WM. Thus, these
results point to the view that there is a specific deficit in older
adults that relates to the learning and application of higher order
associations such as sequential contingencies between events or
probabilistic transition structures (such as in the current task).
Another interpretation of the absence WM effects in older
adults could be that they are less willing (or able) to use an effort-
ful decision strategy that relies on WM and rather fall back on
a simpler decision strategy such as win-stay and lose-shift (Mata
et al., 2010). This is somewhat supported by the modeling results,
which suggest that older adults focus more on the most recent
outcome than younger adults. However, given the overall per-
formance deficits in older adults (see Figure 2C) such a strategy
seems to reflect an adaptation to a behavioral impairment rather
than a general difference in their approach to the task.
EFFECTS OF PROBABILITY RANGE ON MODEL-BASED BEHAVIOR
The analyses of the stay-switch behavior also revealed that model-
based behavior is enhanced when reward probabilities on the
second stage are more differentiable from each other (in the
wide compared to the narrow range probability condition).
Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced in highWMcapacity
groups compared to low WM capacity groups (see Figures 5, 6).
The effects of probability range on model-based behavior are
interesting for several reasons. First of all, these findings show that
a manipulation that seems to primarily affect the second stage
of the task can lead to a greater degree of model-based decision-
making on the first stage of the task. That is, more differentiated
value representations on the second stage seem to support model-
based behavior on the first stage. Second, the interaction with
WM capacity suggests that enhanced model-based behavior in
individuals with high WM capacity may be due to a better abil-
ity to maintain and update those value representations in WM.
Interestingly, a follow-up analysis of these results showed that
greater model-based behavior in the wide probability range was
primarily driven by enhanced stay behavior after common tran-
sitions that were followed by reward. This finding is in line with
the idea that more differentiated reward probabilities on the sec-
ond stage result in more consistent stay behavior on the first stage
options, presumably by reducing uncertainty about the currently
best option. The idea here would be that a greater distinctive-
ness of the value of choice options on the second stage supports
the updating of those values in WM, particularly in individuals
with high WM capacity. A better representation of the values of
the different options on the second stage may then lead to more
consistent choice behavior after common transitions that were
followed by reward (i.e., in situations in which the available evi-
dence indicates that the best thing to do is to stick to the option
that has been chosen on the previous trial). Although such an
interpretation seems speculative, it is consistent with theoretical
ideas, suggesting that WM updating may be regulated by phasic
dopaminergic prediction error signals (Braver and Cohen, 2000;
Frank et al., 2001; D’Ardenne et al., 2012). According to the gating
theory, it could be argued that the probability range manipulation
results in more distinctive prediction error signaling and hence
more reliable value representation for the different second-stage
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choice options. A more reliable and differentiated representation
of state-action values in WMmay then support the application of
model-based decision strategies on the first stage of the task.
CONCLUSIONS
Taken together, the current results show impairments in model-
based decision-making in older compared to younger adults.
These deficits are particularly pronounced in situations in which
reward on the previous trial reinforces stay behavior, whereas
the fact that it was an uncharacteristic transition indicates the
need for a shift in decision strategy. In these situations younger
adults engage in a strategic exploration of the task structure,
whereas older adults perseverate on the option they are cur-
rently exploiting. Analyses of the model parameters showed that
decision-making deficits in older adults are associated with less
consistent choice patterns on the second stage and a greater direct
influence of reward on the previous trial on first stage choice
behavior. Thus, the current findings are consistent with the idea
that age-related deficits in model-based decision-making reflect
impairments in the representation and updating of expected
reward value (Eppinger et al., 2011; Chowdury et al., 2013;
Eppinger et al., 2013). As a consequence of those deficits, older
adults rely more on the most recent outcome rather than their
(impoverished) representation of the expected value of choice
options on the second stage.
In addition to age-related changes in goal-directed decision-
making our findings also point to substantial individual dif-
ferences in model-based behavior. In younger adults high WM
capacity is associated with enhanced model-based behavior.
Moreover, this effect is further elevated when reward probabili-
ties on the second stage are more differentiable from each other.
The implications of these effects are two-fold: first, these findings
suggest that model-based behavior is particularly prevalent in
younger individuals with highWM capacity. Second, these results
indicate that high WM capacity supports the ability to maintain
and update (model-free) value representations and use them for
strategic exploration. It could be argued that the absence of aWM
effect on model-based behavior in older adults reflects a floor
effect in WM capacity. However, the fact that age-related deficits
in model-based behavior remain significant even after controlling
for the effects of WM capacity indicates that additional factors
might play a role. Based on recent fMRI findings (Eppinger et al.,
2012) we argue that an under-recruitment of the lateral PFC dur-
ing the integration of expected reward value into model-based
decisions might be one possible explanation for these effects.
AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION
Ben Eppinger, Maik Walter, Shu-Chen Li, Hauke R. Heekeren
designed the study. Ben Eppinger, MaikWalter, acquired and ana-
lyzed the data. Ben Eppinger, MaikWalter, Shu-Chen Li; Hauke R.
Heekeren wrote the manuscript.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Rasmus Bruckner and Katharina
Wermuth for help during data acquisition, as well as our par-
ticipants for their contribution to the study. We are grateful to
Nathanial Daw and Robert C. Wilson for helpful advice regarding
RL modeling. This research was funded by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) grant Bernstein
Focus Neuronal Basis of Learning (FKZ 01Gq0913).
REFERENCES
Baddeley, A. D., Emslie, H., and Nimmo-Smith, I. (eds.). (1992). The Speed and
Capacity of Language Processing (SCOLP) Test. Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk,
England: Thames Valley Test Company.
Balleine, B. W., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). Human and rodent homologies
in action control: cortico-striatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual
action. Neuropsychopharmacology 35, 48–69. doi: 10.1038/npp.2009.131
Bates, D., Maechler, M., and Bolker, B. (2013). lme4: linear mized-effects models
using S4 classes. R version 3.0.2.
Braver, T. S., and Cohen, J. D. (2000). “On the control of control: the role of
dopamine in regulating prefrontal function and working memory,” in Attention
and Performance XVIII, eds. S. Monsell and J. Driver (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press), 713–737.
Carver, C. S., and White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activa-
tion, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: the BIS/BAS
scales. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 319–333. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.319
Chowdury, R., Guitart-Masip, M., Lambert, C., Dayan, P., Huys, Q., Duezel, E.,
et al. (2013). Dopamine restores reward prediction errors in old age. Nat.
Neurosci. 16, 648–653. doi: 10.1038/nn.3364
D’Ardenne, K., Eshel, N., Luka, J., Lenartowicz, A., Nystrom, L. E., and Cohen,
J. D. (2012). Role of prefrontal cortex and the midbrain dopamine system in
working memory updating. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.109, 19900–19909. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1116727109
D’Ardenne, K., Mcclure, S. M., Nystrom, L., and Cohen, J. D. (2008). BOLD
Responses reflecting dopaminergic signals in the human ventral tegmental area.
Science 319, 1264–1267. doi: 10.1126/science.1150605
Daw, N. D., Gershman, S. J., Seymour, B., Dayan, P., and Dolan, R. J. (2011). Model-
based influences on humans’ choices and striatal prediction errors. Neuron 69,
1204–1215. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.02.027
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., and Dayan, P. (2005). Human and rodent homologies in action
control: cortico-striatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual action. Nat.
Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711. doi: 10.1038/nn1560
Doll, B. B., Simon, D. A., and Daw, N. D. (2012). The ubiquity of model-
based reinforcement learning. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 22, 1075–1081. doi:
10.1016/j.conb.2012.08.003
Duncan, J., Schramm, M., Thompson, R., and Dumontheil, I. (2012). Task rules,
working memory and fluid intelligence. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 19, 864–870. doi:
10.3758/s13423-012-0225-y
Ekstrom, R. B., French, J. W., and Harman, H. H. (1976). Kit of Factor-Referenced
Cognitive Tests. Princeton, NJ: E.T. Service.
Eppinger, B., Haemmerer, D., and Li, S.-C. (2011). Neuromodulation of reward-
based learning and decision making in human aging. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1235,
1–17. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06230.x
Eppinger, B., Heekeren, H. R., and Li, S.-C. (2012). “When two birds in the bush
are better than one in the hand: age-related impairments in learning to predict
future rewards,” inAnnual Meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, (NewOrleans,
LA).
Eppinger, B., and Kray, J. (2011). To choose or to avoid: age differences in learn-
ing form positive and negative feedback. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 41–52. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2009.21364
Eppinger, B., Kray, J., Mock, B., and Mecklinger, A. (2008). Better or worse than
expected? Aging, Learning, and the ERN. Neuropsychologia 46, 521–539. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.09.001
Eppinger, B., Schuck, N. W., Nystrom, L. E., and Cohen, J. D. (2013). Reduced stri-
atal responses to reward prediction errors in older compared to younger adults.
J. Neurosci. 33, 9905–9912. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2942-12.2013
Frank, M. J., and Kong, L. (2008). Learning to avoid in older age. Psychol. Aging 23,
392–398. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.23.2.392
Frank, M. J., Loughry, B., and O’Reilly, R. C. (2001). Interactions between frontal
cortex and basal ganglia in working memory: a computational model. Cogn.
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 1, 137–160. doi: 10.3758/CABN.1.2.137
Gershman, S. J., Markman, A. B., and Otto, A. R. (2013). Retrospective revaluation
in sequential decision making: a tale of two systems. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. doi:
10.1037/a0030844. [Epub ahead of print].
www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 253 | 13
Eppinger et al. Age differences goal-directed decision-making
Gläscher, J., Daw, N. D., Dayan, P., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). States
versus rewards: dissociable neural prediction error signals underlying
model-based and model-free reinforcement learning. Neuron 66, 585–595. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2010.04.016
Hämmerer, D., and Eppinger, B. (2012). Dopaminergic and prefrontal con-
tributions to reward-based learning and outcome monitoring during
child development and aging. Dev. Psychol. 48, 862–874. doi: 10.1037/
a0027342
Hämmerer, D., Li, S.-C., Mueller, V., and Lindenberger, U. (2011). Lifespan dif-
ferences in electrophysiological correlates of monitoring gains and losses dur-
ing probabilistic reinforcement learning. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 579–592. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2010.21475
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York. NY: Farrar, Strauss,
Giroux.
Lau, B., and Glimcher, P. W. (2005). Dynamic response-by-response models of
matching behavior in Rhesus monkeys. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 84, 555–579. doi:
10.1901/jeab.2005.110-04
Li, S.-C., Lindenberger, U., Hommel, B., Aschersleben, G., Prinz, W., and Baltes,
P. B. (2004). Transformations in the couplings among intellectual abilities and
constituent cognitive processes across the lifespan. Psychol. Sci. 15, 155–163. doi:
10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.01503003.x
Mata, R., Von Helversen, B., and Rieskamp, J. (2010). Learning to choose: cogni-
tive aging and strategy selection learning in decision making. Psychol. Aging 25,
299–309. doi: 10.1037/a0018923
Miller, E. K., and Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of pre-
frontal cortex function. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24, 167–202. doi:
10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167
Montague, P. R., Hyman, S. E., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). Computational
roles for dopamine in behavioral control. Nature 431, 760–767. doi:
10.1038/nature03015
Nieuwenhuis, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., Talsma, D., Coles, M. G. H., Holroyd, C.
B., Kok, A., et al. (2002). A computational account of altered error process-
ing in older age: dopamine and the error-related negativity. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Neurosci. 2, 19–36. doi: 10.3758/CABN.2.1.19
Niv, Y., Edlund, J. A., Dayan, P., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2012). Neural prediction
errors reveal a risk-sensitive reinforcement-learning process in the human brain.
J. Neurosci. 32, 551–562. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5498-10.2012
Niv, Y., and Schoenbaum, G. (2008). Dialogues on prediction errors. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 12, 265–272. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.03.006
Otto, A. R., Gershman, S. J., Markman, A. B., and Daw, N. D. (2013). The curse
of planning: dissecting multiple reinforcement learning systems by taxing the
central executive. Psychol. Sci. 24, 751–761. doi: 10.1177/0956797612463080
Pietschmann,M., Endrass, T., Czerwon, B., and Kathmann, N. (2011). Aging, prob-
abilistic learning and performance monitoring. Biol. Psychol. 86, 74–82. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.10.009
Raven, J. C., Raven, J. E., and Court, J. H. (eds.). (1998). Progressive Matrices.
Oxford: Oxford Psychologists Press.
R Development Core and Team (2010). R: A Language and Environment for
Statistical Computing. Vienna: R.F.F.S. Computing.
Rummery, G., and Niranjan, M. (1994). On-line Q-learning Using Connectionist
Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Salthouse, T. A. (1994). The aging of workingmemory.Neuropsychology 8, 535–543.
doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.8.4.535
Salthouse, T. A., Mitchell, D. R. D., Skovronek, E., and Babcock, R. L. (1989).
Effects of adult age and working memory on reasoning and spatial abili-
ties. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 15, 507–516. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.
15.3.507
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Kuhnen, C. M., Yoo, D. J., and Knutson, B. (2010).
Variability in nucleus accumbens activity mediates age-related suboptimal
financial risk taking. J. Neurosci. 27, 1426–1434.
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Levens, S. M., Perry, L. M., Dougherty, R. F., and
Knutson, B. (2012). Frontostriatal white matter integrity mediates adult age
differences in probabilistic reward learning. J. Neurosci. 32, 5333–5337. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5756-11.2012
Schultz,W., Dayan, P., andMontague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of predicition
and reward. Science 275, 1593–1599. doi: 10.1126/science.275.5306.1593
Sutton, R. S., and Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction
(Adaptive Computation and Machine Learning). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal Intelligence. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychol. Rev. 55, 189–208.
doi: 10.1037/h0061626
Turner, M. L., and Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task depen-
dent. J. Mem. Lang. 28, 127–154. doi: 10.1016/0749-596X(89)90040-5
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Dschrock, J. C., and Engle, R. W. (2005). An auto-
mated version of the operation span task. Behav. Res. Methods 37, 498–505. doi:
10.3758/BF03192720
Worthy, D. A., Gorlick, M. A., Pacheco, J. L., Schnyer, D. M., and Maddox, W. T.
(2011). With age come wisdom: decision making in younger and older adults.
Psychol. Sci. 22, 1375–1380. doi: 10.1177/0956797611420301
Worthy, D. A., and Maddox, W. T. (2012). Age-based differences in strategy use in
choice tasks. Front. Neurosci. 5:145. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2011.00145
Wunderlich, K., Smittenaar, P., and Dolan, R. J. (2012). Dopamine enhances
model-based over model-free behavior. Neuron 75, 418–424. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.03.042
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 10 July 2013; accepted: 06 December 2013; published online: 24 December
2013.
Citation: Eppinger B, Walter M, Heekeren HR and Li S-C (2013) Of goals and
habits: age-related and individual differences in goal-directed decision-making. Front.
Neurosci. 7:253. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00253
This article was submitted to Decision Neuroscience, a section of the journal Frontiers
in Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2013 Eppinger, Walter, Heekeren and Li. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 253 | 14
